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I. Introductionl 
Review of the 1969 decisions in juvenile law reveals that 
the courts in California, as elsewhere, have been traumatized 
by the recent transplant of constitutional due process into the 
formerly barren soil of the juvenile code. For sixty years, 
children in most American jurisdictions were hidden from 
constitutional view.2 The fiction persisted that they were 
not tried but treated. If a child carne to the attention of the 
juvenile court, he did so because his parents had failed to ful-
fill their function. The court succeeded to their role and, 
1. This article considers all the sig-
nificant California cases since May, 
1967, as well as mentioning every case 
reported in the October, 1968, to Oc-
tober, 1969, period. There are three 
justifications for the expanded scope of 
the article. First, the starting date of 
the review coincides with the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in In 
Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). Juvenile law 
cases since that date are subject to 
meaningful analysis only in relation to 
that decision. Second, this article in-
tends to update the signficant overview 
of California juvenile law presented in 
the symposium on Youth and the Law, 
19 Hastings L.J., No. 1 (Nov. 1967). 
For the relatively uninitiated practition-
er, the most useful article on the Cal-
ifornia juvenile system is Boches, 
Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-
526 
evaluation, 19 Hastings L.J. 47 (1967). 
See, also, California Juvenile Court 
Practice, California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar, California Practice 
Book No. 39 (1968); R. Cipes, How to 
Defend a Criminal Case, Ch. 60 (Mat-
thew Bender, 1969). Finally, the fact 
that this is the first juvenile law article 
in the Cal Law-Trends and Develop-
ments series excuses a more compre-
hensive orientation for understanding 
of the recent cases. 
2. The first juvenile court was creat-
ed in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899. 
Since then, every state has adopted a 
separate court process for juveniles dis-
tinct from the normal adult criminal 
procedures. For broad treatment of 
the philosophy and practice of the 
juvenile court system, see Mack, The 
Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 
(1909). 
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in the name of parens patriae, exercised only the power it had 
thus derived to fashion an appropriate cure. Juvenile law 
was said to be noncriminal. The forum was viewed not so 
much as a court but as a social services laboratory, in which 
the specimen unfortunately might be required to languish 
until his majority rendered him judicially cognizable. 
As every lawyer knows, the United States Supreme Court 
has now finally discovered a place for juveniles within the 
Constitution. Kent v. United States3 and In Re Gault4 have 
found that a largely unfulfilled promise of corrective treat-
ment does not justify the immunity of the juvenile process 
from constitutional scrutiny. In the following Court term, 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict5 brought the Constitution through the schoolhouse door. 
Taken together, these three cases at least sketch the dimen-
sions of the proposition that children, too, are citizens, en-
titled to fundamental constitutional rights and liberties. 
It is within this still-obscure outline that the courts are 
working. The present article, accordingly, traces the Cali-
fornia response to Gault's imperative that the Constitution 
be applied to those who are under the age of twenty-one. 
II. In Re Gault: Answers and Questions 
A. The Holding in Gault 
Constitutional due process, applied to the juvenile court, 
requires: 
1. Adequate Notice of Charges: 
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, 
must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court 
proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare 
will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged mis-
conduct with particularity. . . . "6 
3. 383 U.S. 541, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 86 5. 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89 
S.Ct. 1045 (1966). S.Ct. 733 (1969). 
4. 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 6~ 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
S.Ct. 1428 (1967). 549, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967). 
CAL LAW 1970 527 
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2. Right to Counsel: 
[T]he child and his parent must be notified of the 
child's right to be represented by counsel retained by 
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that coun-
sel will be appointed to represent the child [at delin-
quency proceedings at which commitment may resultV 
3. Self-incrimination: 
[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is applicable in the case of juveniles.8 
4. Confrontation and Cross-Examination: 
[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of de-
linquency and commitment cannot 
be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subject-
ed to the opportunity for cross-examination.9 
B. What Gault Refused To Answer 
Gault, and its precursor, Kent, expressly declined to con-
sider a host of problems, and they are questions that litiga-
tion since Gault and Kent has tried to answer. 
The issues that the Court in Gault expressly refused to an-
swer are: 
1. Right of appeal; 
2. Right to a transcript of proceedings;lO 
3. Rules of evidence-specifically the admissibility 
of hearsay; 
4. Rights at pre-judicial stages; 
5. Rights at postadjudicative stages; 
6. Right to bail; 
7. 387 U.S. 1, 41, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
553, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451. 
8. 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
561,87 S.Ct. 1428, 1458. 
9. 387 U.S. 1, 57, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
562-563, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1459. 
10. These first two points were urged 
upon the Gault Court as independent 
grounds for reversal. Because of the 
528 
Court's disposition of the case, it re-
fused to reach determination of these 
questions. (387 U.S. 1, 58, 18 L.Ed.2d 
527, 563, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1459.) The 
Court did, however, by reference to its 
earlier decision in Kent, suggest the 
constitutional importance of adequate 
review of juvenile proceedings. Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 16 
L.Ed.2d 84, 97, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966). 
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7. Right to arraignment; 
8. Right to indictment by grand jury; 
9. Right to public trial; 
10. Right to trial by jury; 
11. Arrest without warrant in misdemeanor cases; and 
12. Standard of proof. 
C. Policy Considerations Not Raised by Gault 
It is both predictable and proper that the United States 
Supreme Court should have limited its Kent and Gault opin-
ions to those questions required for disposition of the par-
ticular cases. But lower courts, including California's, in deci-
sions since Gault, plainly have been troubled more by the 
Court's failure to indicate a coherent analytical approach to 
juvenile law then by the Court's refusal to adjudicate specific 
issues not required for resolution of the cases before the 
Court. The narrower questions could be answered more 
readily if there were a consistent rationale within which to do 
so. Unfortunately, Kent and Gault fail to provide such a 
rationale.l1 
The question of greatest significance is the precise extent 
to which children possess the constitutional rights of their 
elders. In Gault, the Court said that ". neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
only . . . ,"12 and, again, that "[u]nder our Constitution, 
the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 
••• "13 Between the kangaroo court and the modern adult 
criminal process stands a vast terrain, the terms of occupancy 
of which the Supreme Court has not defined. In Gault, the 
Court was content merely to repeat its earlier dictum in 
Kent that "[t]he hearing must measure up to the essentials 
of due process and fair treatment, . . ."14 
11. See Welch, Kent v. United States 
and In Re Gault: Two Decisions in 
Search of A Theory, 19 Hastings LJ. 
29 (1967). See generally Paulsen, 
Kent v. United States, the Constitution-
al Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 167. 
CAL LAW 1970 
12. 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
538, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967). 
13. 387 U.S. 1, 28, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
546-547, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1444. 
14. 383 U.S. 541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d 
84, 97-98, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966). 
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Several times in Gault, the Court took care to limit its dis-
cussion to delinquency proceedings that might result in com-
mitment.15 Thus, the applicability of constitutional stand-
ards to the important areas of dependency and neglect cases, 
and, to some extent, wayward youth cases, is left untouched. 
While Chief Judge Bazelon may be correct that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has recently revolutionized the procedural 
aspects of juvenile court proceedings . . . ," Kent v. United 
States16 (still the same Kent, after remand), the cases dis-
cussed below leave no doubt that the revolution in California 
is not yet over. 
III. Post·Gault Statutory Changes 
The premise of this review is that recent juvenile law cases 
fall into a pattern on the basis of Gault, the questions it an-
swered, and those it did not. It is also worth a brief look 
at the legislative response to Gault. The statutory changes 
serve two functions. First, they remove certain problems 
from the courts' purview. Second, the legislative voice may 
inform judicial consideration of the issues that remain. 
The California Juvenile Court Law appears in Welfare 
and Institutions Code sections 500 through 945, substantially 
as it was reenacted in 1961. This revision cured many de-
fects that Gault would have condemned. Still, ten changes 
to the California Juvenile Court Law, all passed in 1967, 
reflect the Gault decision by introducing or extending the me-
chanics of procedural due process from adult criminal pro-
cedures into the juvenile court.17 Consistently with the dis-
15. "We do not in this opinion con-
sider the impact of these constitutional 
provisions upon the totality of the re-
lationship of the juvenile and the state. 
We do not even consider the entire 
process relating to juvenile 'delinquents' 
. . . We consider only . . . pro-
ceedings by which a determination is 
made as to whether a juvenile is a 'de-
linquent' as a result of alleged miscon-
duct on his part, with the consequence 
530 
that he may be committed to a state 
institution." 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L.Ed. 
2d 527, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436 
(1967). 
16. 401 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). But see the dissent in that case, 
401 F.2d 408, 412-416, for some inti-
mation of the views of the new United 
States Supreme Court Chief Justice, 
then Circuit Judge, Burger. 
17. For a review of more recent Cal-
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tinction made in Gault, all ten changes apply only to delin-
quent and wayward youth cases,18 and not to dependency and 
neglect matters.19 
1. Welfare and Institutions Code section 625 has been 
amended to require that all section 601 and section 602 minors 
taken into temporary custody by a peace officer, must be ad-
vised of: 
a. the priVilege against self-incrimination; 
b. the right to remain silent; 
c. the right to counsel; and 
d. the right to appointment of counsel if the minor is 
unable to afford one. 
2. Welfare and Institutions Code section 627.5 was add-
ed to implement exercise of the same constitutional rights 
at the time a minor is delivered into the custody of a proba-
tion officer. 
3. Before 1967, if a probation officer filed a petition for 
detention of a youth, notice of a detention hearing needed 
to be given only to the minor's parents. Amendment of sec-
tion 630 now additionally requires notice to the youth him-
self and provides him with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and the right to confrontation by, and cross-examina-
tion of, witnesses at the detention hearing. 
4. New section 630.1 extends all rights to notice to a 
youth's counsel of record. 
5. Where appointment of counsel at detention hearings 
formerly was discretionary, amendment of section 634 now 
makes appointment mandatory in virtually every situation. 
6. Sections 658 and 660 enlarge notice requirements relat-
ing to the adjudicatory hearing. 
7. The amendment to section 679 directs the court to 
ifornia legislative considerations of the 
juvenile court law, see Comment, The 
California Juvenile: His Rights and 
Remedies, 1 Pacific L.J. 350 (1970). 
18. Delinquent juveniles are de-
scribed in Welfare and Institutions Code 
CAL LAW 1970 
§ 602. Wayward youths are described 
in Welfare and Institutions Code § 601. 
19. Dependent and neglected children 
are described in Welfare and Institu-
tions Code § 600. 
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appoint an attorney, at the adjudicatory stage, for minors 
who are unable to afford counsel and who are alleged to be 
within Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 or 602. 
8. Section 700 repeats the directive that alleged delin-
quent and wayward youths be represented by counsel at the 
jurisdictional hearing. 
9. The Gault guarantees of the privilege against self-in-
crimination and the right to confrontation by, and cross-
examination of, witnesses is codified in section 702.5. 
10. Although the Court in Gault expressly declined to de-
cide the issue, the right of a youth unable to afford counsel 
to be furnished a free copy of the hearing transcript for ap-
peal is embodied in an amendment to section 800. 
One final 1967 statutory change deserves discussion: 
the amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. 
That section provides the procedure variously known as refer-
ral, transfer, or waiver by the juvenile court of a minor, 16 
years of age or older and unfit for treatment within the facil-
ities of the juvenile court, to adult criminal court. Kent v. 
United States involved such a proceeding, and the subject 
amendment obviously was intended to bring section 707 into 
conformity with that decision. While Kent was decided within 
the context of a District of Columbia statute, the case's hold-
ing, that a waiver order must be accompanied by a sufficiently 
specific statement of the reasons for the order,20 has been 
incorporated into section 707. Waiver now cannot be pred-
icated solely on the nature of the alleged offense but must be 
supported by an investigative report of the minor's "behavioral 
patterns." Presumably, Kent's requirement of representation 
by counsel at the waiver hearing is satisfied by the provision 
of Welfare and Institutions Code section 633 that a minor 
20. 383 U.S. 541, 561, 16 L.Ed.2d 
84,97,86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057. The reason 
for the requirement is to permit ade-
quate review. Kent also decided that 
waiver may be accomplished only at a 
hearing where the minor may be repre-
sented by counsel, who is entitled to 
see the child's social records to be con-
532 
sidered by the Court. The Court man-
dated a hearing containing the "essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment," 
383 U.S. 541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 
97-98, 86 S.Ct. 1045. See, Paulsen, 
Kent v. United States, the Constitu-
tional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 167 (1966). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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has the". . . right . . . to be represented at every stage 
of the proceeding by counsel." 
IV. The Recent Cases 
A. Standard of Proof2o.5 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 701 requires that an 
adjudication that a minor is a delinquent must be supported 
by "a preponderance of evidence."l The adult criminal stand-
ard, of course, calls for proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."2 
The question whether Gault impliedly compels the higher 
standard of proof in juvenile cases has now been before the 
United States Supreme Court three times but remains unan-
swered: In Re Whittington,3 (judgment vacated and case 
remanded for consideration in light of Gault); De Backer v. 
Brainard,4 (issue not properly raised); In Re Winship,5 (prob-
able jurisdiction noted) . 
While definitive resolution may appear elusive, the question 
has been set to rest in California by the state Supreme Court 
in In Re M.6 There, the court held simply that "in the ab-
sence of a specific ruling on the issue by the United States 
Supreme Court, we adhere to the pre-Gault view of our courts 
that the established standard [of proof upon a preponderance 
20.5. Since preparation of this ar-
ticle the United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that juveniles are constitution-
ally entitled to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt when they are charged with 
a violation of criminal law, In re Win-
ship, 396 U.S. -, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 
S.Ct. 1068, -. The Court noted and 
overruled the California Supreme Court 
decision in In Re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 
444, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296 
(1969), the case discussed in this section 
of the article on standard of proof. 
Nothing in the United States Supreme 
Court decision requires extended dis-
cussion. The Court's analysis and 
rationale seem totally consistent with 
the approach and the conclusion of 
this article. 
CAL LAW 1970 
1. The same standard of proof, "a 
preponderance of evidence," applies to 
findings of §§ 600, 601, and 602. A dis-
tinction is made, however, in that a § 
602 finding must be based on evidence 
"legally admissible in the trial of crim-
inal cases," while the less stringent test 
of "legally admissible in the trial of civil 
cases" applies to § 600 and § 601 cases. 
2. Penal Code § 1096. 
3. 391 U.S. 341, 20 L.Ed.2d 625, 88 
S.Ct. 1507 (1968). 
4. 396 U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 60, 148, 
90 S.Ct. 163 (1969). 
5. 396 U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 160, 90 
S.Ct. 179 (1969). 
6. 70 Cal.2d 444, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
450 P.2d 296. 
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of the evidence] is valid.,,7 In Re M is a lengthy and far-
ranging opinion, the California Supreme Court's only juvenile 
law decision in 1969, and it deserves some statement of the 
facts. 
The minor stole an automobile from which he removed 
a .22 caliber revolver. Ten days later, he visited his 15-year-
old girlfriend and had talked with her outside her house for 
about 15 minutes when a shot was fired. The girlfriend's 
father emerged from the house and found his daughter shot 
in the head. No one was present but the minor. M told the 
father that a passerby had fired the shot and promptly went off 
in pursuit. The minor shortly returned without success, 
and when a sheriff arrived on the scene, repeated the assertion 
that a passerby was responsible for the crime. An hour later, 
however, confronted by more sheriffs, who had found a .22 cali-
ber revolver in a nearby flowerbed, the minor admitted he 
had shot the girl. He said it was an accident; he had been 
playing with the gun. Four days later, the girl died. The 
minor was charged with involuntary manslaughter, gun theft, 
and auto theft, and a Welfare and Institutions Code section 
602 petition was filed and sustained. The minor, who pre-
viously had been a ward of the court, was committed to the 
Youth Authority. 
Justice Mosk, writing for the court, makes a two-part 
analysis of the standard-of-proof issue. First, he examines 
the explicit holding of Gault and concludes that the United 
States Supreme Court did not expressly require application 
of the adult standard. Indeed, that question, having been 
raised on appeal from an Arizona decision, was among the 
issues the court refrained from considering.s 
Then the broader question is posed: did Gault ". . . by 
implication [require] that this element of adult criminal trials 
be incorporated into our juvenile court law,,?9 Stated dif-
7. 70 Ca1.2d 444, 460-462, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 11, 450 P.2d 296, 305-306. 
8. 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 537, 
87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). See the section 
"What Gault Refused To Answer," su-
pra. 
534 
9. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301 
(1969). 
CAL. L.AW 1970 10
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19
Juvenile Law 
ferently, is the higher standard of proof one of those "essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment"IO that the Constitution 
extends to juveniles? 
For guidance upon this issue, the court looks to decisions 
of sister courts, opinions of law review writers, recommenda-
tions of model act draftsmen, and the views of a multitude of 
scholars. The survey yields only "disarray" and "divergence." 
Attention also turned to the legislature. The court reviews 
the work of the 1957 Special Commission on Juvenile Law,ll 
the revised Juvenile Act that resulted from the commission's 
study/2 and, finally, the 1967 legislative response to Gault. 
The Court concluded that "the legislature, moreover, has been 
fully responsive to Gault."13 
The pivotal criterion adopted by the court is then articulat-
ed: "Such deliberate acts of the Legislature come before us 
clothed with a presumption of constitutionality."14 Applying 
this presumption, the court concluded: 
[I]n any event, we cannot say that the Legislature plainly 
exceeded constitutional limits in finding that the bene-
fits of the reasonable doubt standard would be out-
weighed by the adverse effects of imposing that doctrine 
of adult criminal law on the essentially remedial proceed-
ings of the juvenile court. I5 
The nub of the decision on this issue, then, is the charac-
terization of the juvenile process as "essentially remedial." 
But this is to echo the time-dishonored rhetoric that Gault 
10. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 
541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97-98, 86 
S.Ct. 1045 (1966). 
11. Report of Governor's Special 
Study Commission on Juvenile Justice 
(1960). 
12. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1616, pp. 3459-
3508. 
13. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301 
(1969). 
14. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301 
CAL LAW 1970 
(1969). Regardless of the general util-
ity of this maxim, its precise reference 
is far from clear. Presumably, the 
phrase "deliberate acts" does not refer 
to the 1961 enactment, which, of course, 
predated Gault. But should the legis-
lature's 1967 amendments to other stat-
utes in the Juvenile Code, taken together 
with its silence regarding the § 701 
standard of proof, be dignified as "delib-
erate acts"? 
15. 70 Cal.2d 444, 457-458, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 9, 450 P.2d 296, 303-304. 
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meant to silence. However laudable the court's reluctance to 
"introduce a strong tone of criminality into the proceedings,"16 
incarceration, the same consequence as that which results from 
a "criminal" trial, emanates from the juvenile proceeding. 
Gault expressly rejects the notion that the serious ramifica-
tions of the juvenile court adjudication may in any way be 
sloughed off simply by declaring the process "remedial." "A 
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found 
to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for 
years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."17 
The Court continued, "Neither sentiment nor folklore should 
cause us to shut our eyes.,,18 
But even assuming that rehabilitation of minors is enhanced 
by their separate and different treatment, it does not follow 
that these benefits are lost by "constitutional domestication" 
of the juvenile process. Indeed, the principle established by 
Gault is that while not every feature of the adult criminal 
procedure must be afforded juveniles, neither may the ab-
sence of such safeguards be justified except upon the clearest 
showing that their implementation would substantially disrupt 
the juvenile law concept. "But the features of the juvenile 
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique bene-
fit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For 
example, the commendable principles relating to the process-
ing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in 
no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under dis-
cussion. "19 
Application of this test to the issue of standard of proof 
presented by In Re M-would the requirement of proof be-
16. 70 Ca1.2d 444, 456-457, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 8, 450 P.2d 296, 302-303. 
17. 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
551, 87 S.Ct. 1428, - (1967). 
18. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
541-542, 87 S.Ct. 1428, -. "Here 
again, however, there is substantial ques-
tion as to whether fact and pretension, 
with respect to the separate handling and 
treatment of children, . . . coincide 
it should be noted that to the 
536 
extent that the special procedures for 
juveniles are thought to be justified by 
the special consideration and treatment 
afforded them, there is reason to doubt 
that juveniles always receive the bene-
fits of such a quid pro quo." 387 
U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 543, 87 S.Ct. 
1428. 
19. 387 U.S. 1, 22, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
543, 87 S.Ct. 1428. 
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yond a reasonable doubt militate against the rehabilitative 
goal of the juvenile court-produces a result contrary to that 
which the California court reached. Nor does the decision 
contain adequate support, in spite of its length, for such a re-
sult. There is a suggestion that "speedy and individualized 
rehabilitative services," and "a prompt factual decision," are 
in the minor's best interests. This may certainly be so. But 
there is no reason why a higher standard of proof precludes 
promptness. There is no reason to believe that an appear-
ance of unreliability, even in the name of speedy adjudica-
tion, enhances the juvenile court's rehabilitative goals.20 
To attribute a presumption of constitutionality to the legis-
lature is to abdicate the court's role. Gault requires realism. 
As Justice Peters in his dissent makes clear: 
Realistically, a proceeding that may result in such con-
finement and restraint is adversary in nature and crimi-
nal in effect. To hold that such a proceeding is not 
adversary in nature and criminal in effect is to close 
one's eyes to the realities of the situation, and, as well, 
is contrary to the teachings of Gault.1 
In Re M indicates the California Supreme Court's unwill-
ingness to conform the state's juvenile law to the spirit of 
Gault. The letter of Gault has been codified. The guiding 
principle of that opinion, however, that the fundamentals of 
constitutional due process-including proof beyond a reason-
able doubt-be excluded from the juvenile law only if they 
deprive a minor of the special and beneficial status that the 
juvenile law should accord, has been rejected. 
Several California Courts of Appeal have also been con-
20. "Whenever juvenile courts do not 
scrupulously follow the principles of 
procedural due process in their dealings 
with minors-whenever the juvenile is 
lulled into a feeling of serenity only to 
receive stern disciplining-he 'feels that 
he has been deceived or enticed,' and 
thus rebels against and resists the re-
habilitative efforts of the court person-
CAL LAW 1970 
nel." In Re H.L.R., 269 Cal. App.2d 
610, 75 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1969), citing 
Wheeler and Cottrell, Juvenile Delin-
quency-Its Prevention and Control, 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1966, p. 35. 
1. 70 Cal.2d 444, 465-466, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 14-15, 450 P.2d 296, 308-309 
(1969). 
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fronted with the standard-of-proof issue.! In Re K.D.K.,3 
like In re M, considers, as it should, that Gault is controlling. 
But, again, like the California Supreme Court, the lower court 
was impressed that California's juvenile laws "already were 
free of the specific defects found constitutionally fatal in 
Gault."4 Thus, determination of the specific standard-of-
proof question is made to depend on (I) confining the effect 
of Gault to the limited holding of the case, and (2) the seem-
ingly fortuitous circumstance that many other provisions of the 
state's Juvenile Code were revised in 1961. 
Perhaps most unfortunate is the K.D.K. court's retention of 
the juvenile law rhetoric: "We are not prepared to depart 
from the holdings of the California courts that proceedings 
in the juvenile court are, indeed, of a civil nature."5 Nor is it 
deemed persuasive that the juvenile court hearing "may result 
in a deprivation of liberty to the juvenile." 
Thus, the Court refused to recognize the "realities" of the 
Gault analysis of juvenile proceedings, for example, "the awe-
some prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the 
juvenile reaches the age of 2l."6 In this sense, K.D.K. is seen 
to be a pre-Gault decision. Indeed, the Court's failure to 
apply the Gault approach may be explained by its dictum that 
"[the juvenile court system] can hardly suffer further attri-
tion and maintain its essential character.,,7 
2. While the standard-of-proof con-
tention was raised in In re F, 270 Cal. 
App.2d 603, 75 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1969), 
the court of appeal thought the issue 
conclusively determined by In Re M, 
supra, and summarily rejected the ar-
gument. 
3. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
136 (1969). 
4. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 652, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 136, 140-141. 
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 653, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 136, 141. 
6. 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
551, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). 
7. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 750. The 
standard-of-proof issue was raised in a 
538 
novel context in the case of In Re 
J.F., 268 Cal. App.2d 761, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 464 (1969). The case involved a 
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1800 
proceeding at which the California 
Youth Authority is authorized to peti-
tion the court for continued commit-
ment of a person who reaches 21 years 
of age and whose discharge "would be 
physically dangerous to the public be-
cause of his mental or physical defi-
ciency, disorder, or abnormality." The 
court noted that no statutory standard 
of proof is prescribed for § 1800 pro-
ceedings. The court distinguished a 
§ 1800 hearing from a § 602 hearing, 
at which proof of a criminal act is re-
quired. The court stated that § 1800 
CAL LAW 1970 14
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B. Waiver of Miranda Rights 
The express holding in Gault introduced into the juvenile 
field the constitutional rights enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court one year earlier in Miranda v. Arizona.s 
Miranda held that: 
[P]rior to any questioning [by law enforcement officers 
of a suspect], the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.9 
The Court also stated that a defendant may waive these 
rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently."lo Applied to the juvenile process, waiver 
of counsel raises the question whether a minor, because of 
his age, can ever "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" 
waive his rights. The answer in California is that he can. 
The leading case on juvenile waiver of Miranda rights is 
People v. Lara. ll Lara and In Re M are the California Su-
preme Court's only juvenile law decisions since Gault. Both 
Lara and M were six-to-one decisions, written by Justice Mosk, 
with dissents by Justice Peters. 
Lara and his codefendant, Alvarez, were convicted, in adult 
criminal court, of murder.12 Both had been advised several 
times during the course of police investigation of their Miranda 
rights. Both nonetheless wrote out and signed confessions to 
the crime. Neither took advantage of his right to counsel. 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the argu-
proceedings more closely resemble nar-
cotics proceedings. Then, even assum-
ing that Gault applied to § 1800 hear-
ings, the court found the "civil" nature 
of the proceeding to justify the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof. 
8. 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 
S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d 974 (1966). 
9. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 
CAL. LAW 1970 
706, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d 974, 
993. 
10. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694, 706, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d 
974, 993. 
11. 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967). 
12. Lara was 18 years old and Al-
varez was one month short of 18 at 
the time the crime was committed. 
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ment that no minor is capable of effective waiver unless the 
waiver is also consented to by a friendly adult-parent, 
guardian, or attorney-who himself has received a Miranda 
warning.13 Instead, the court adopted a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test: 
"This, then, is the general rule: a minor has the capacity 
to make a voluntary confession, even of capital offenses, 
without the presence or consent of counselor other re-
sponsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession 
depends not on his age alone but on a combination of 
that factor with other circumstances as his intelligence, 
education, experience, and ability to comprehend the 
meaning and effect of his statement."14 
Both defendants contended that they had not intelligently 
and understandingly waived their rights. They argued that 
they were member,« of a minority group, with little education 
(ninth or tenth grade) and IiO money, and were affected 
by alcohol and lack of sleep. A psychologist testified without 
contradiction that Alvarez had an 1.0. of 65 to 71, "mild 
mental retardation," and a mental age of 1 0 years, 2 months. 
A pyschiatrist for the state in rebuttal said that Alvarez pos-
sessed "innate shrewdness" and "the accumulated life experi-
ence of a 17-year-old person."15 
The Court rejected some of the minor's assertions, mini-
mized others, and concluded that, in the totality of the circum-
stances, the waivers had been effective. The factors that mili-
tated most unfavorably against the minors seemed to be (1) 
their demeanor during the interrogation ("very calm" and 
"cognizant and aware"); (2) their relatively advanced age 
13. 67 Ca1.2d 365, 378-380, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 586, 596, 432 P.2d 202, 212. 
Justice Peters, in dissent, states that 
this should be the rule. It is not certain 
whether his opinion squares with the 
California legislature'S amendment to 
Code of Civ. Proc. § 372 shortly after 
the Gault decision issued. The perti-
nent part of that amendment reads: 
"Nothing in this section or in any other 
540 
provision . . . is intended by the 
legislature to prohibit a minor from ex-
ercising an intelligent and knowing 
waiver of his constitutional rights in any 
proceeding under the Juvenile Court 
Law .... " 
14. 67 Cal.2d 365, 383-384, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 586, 599, 432 P.2d 202, 215. 
15. 67 Cal.2d 365, 377-378, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 586, 595, 432 P.2d 202, 211. 
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(about 18) ; (3) their prior experience with the police; and (4) 
their apparent comprehension of the warning (each wrote a 
statement of Miranda rights into his confession). 
On these facts, Justice Peters concedes, the majority prop-
erly could have applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
to have found that an adult had effectively waived the Miranda 
rights. But, the dissent argues, this begs the question whether, 
because of his age, a minor, alone, ever can effectively waive 
his constitutional rights. The court's mistake, Justice Peters 
writes, is to emphasize the conduct of the police, rather than 
the competency of the youth. Had the court's focus been on 
the capacity of the minor, the court would have had to ac-
knowledge the minor's general legal incompetence in civil 
matters. As one writer has pointed out, the civil law estab-
lishes the presumption of incompetence to protect the vast 
number of minors, even though it is certain that a few, in fact, 
are capable of protecting their own interests.16 Adoption of 
this presumption to the Miranda waiver would require the 
police to refrain from interrogating the minor until he is in the 
company of a friendly adult. Apparently, the State Supreme 
Court is not ready to place this burden on the police.16.5 
As Justice Peters points out, the cases most relied on by 
the court reach a contrary result.17 In these decisions, the 
16. Note, Waiver of Constitutional 
Rights by Minors: A Question of 
Law or Fact?, 19 Hastings L.J. 223 at 
224 (1967). 
16.5. A recent federal district court 
decision reaches a contrary conclusion. 
In holding that the state had failed to 
provide adequate legal assistance to 
minors brought before the juvenile court 
in San Francisco, the court held that 
the law required that counsel be pro-
vided at the "first point of contact," 
at that critical stage in the proceedings 
when the "juveniles are faced with the 
awesome determination whether to 
waive counsel." Scott v. Mayer, N. D. 
Cal. Civil No. C-70 441 GSL (April 
13, 1970). 
CAL. LAW 1970 
17. The majority cites the leading 
cases from the United States Supreme 
Court: Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 
370 U.S. 49, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 82 S.Ct. 
1209, 87 AL.R.2d 614 (1962) and 
Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 
92 L.Ed. 224, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948). See 
also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 9 
L.Ed.2d 770,83 S.Ct. 745 (1963); Reck 
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 6 L.Ed.2d 948, 
81 S.Ct. 1541 (1961); Payne v. State 
of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 2 L.Ed.2d 
975, 78 S.Ct. 884 (1958); Mallory v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 499, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1479, 77 S.Ct. 1356 (1957). 
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focus was on the minors, variously described as "a mere child," 
"an easy victim of the law," "tender and difficult," "a lad in 
his early teens." 
The failure to place principal emphasis on the special status 
of minors exposes the court to Justice Peters' criticism that it 
disregards Gault18 and relegates minors to the second-class 
citizenship from which Gault and Kent tried to free them.18.5 
Lara and In Re M, read together, reveal the California 
Supreme Court's determination to limit Gault to its precise 
holding. The United States Supreme Court was able to decide 
that case on the basis of four aspects of the adjudicatory 
hearing. In Re M refuses to extend Gault to other facets 
of that hearing. Lara refuses to extend Gault back to the pre-
adjudicatory stages.19 
In Lara, the California Supreme Court held juveniles to 
the adult test for effective waiver, consideration of age hav-
ing some unknown effect. But in In Re M, the court with-
holds from juveniles the benefit of adult standard of proof. 
As the United States Supreme Court noted: 
18. The Lara court's sole acknowl-
edgment of Gault is contained in one 
footnote, which begins, "Our decision 
here is not affected by In Re Gault," 
67 Ca1.2d 365, 391, 392, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
586, 604, fn. 21, 432 P.2d 202, 220 
(1967). This statement by the court is 
not a completely accurate reflection of 
Gault. Gault contained the following 
guidance, unheeded by the Lara court, 
with regard to the Miranda issue: "If 
counsel was not present for some per-
missible reason when an admission was 
obtained, the greatest care must be tak-
en to assure that the admission was 
voluntary, in the sense not only that it 
has not been coerced or suggested, but 
also that it is not the product of ignor-
ance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, 
fright, or despair," 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 
L.Ed.2d 527, 561, 87 S.Ct. 1428 
(1967). 
18.5. But c/. In re R., 1 Cal.2d 855, 
542 
83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127 (1970), 
a California Supreme Court decision is-
sued since preparation of this article. 
The court holds "that the juvenile court 
should consider whether a child ap-
preciates the wrongfulness of his con-
duct in determining whether the child 
should be declared a ward of section 
602 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code (Pen. Code, § 26)." 
19. The California court's restrictive 
approach is no less clear in the limita-
tion of both Haley, supra, and Gal/egos, 
supra, to their strict holding. "For our 
present purposes, however, the primary 
significance of Haley and Gallegos is 
that the high court declined to hold 
that as a matter of law all minors with-
out such advice [of a friendly adult] 
lack the capacity to make voluntary 
confessions," 67 Cal.2d 365, 382-383, 
62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 598, 432 P.2d 202, 
214. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds 
for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.20 
The waiver rule was also in issue in In Re M. The facts 
present a 15-year-old boy to whom the Miranda warning was 
read from a card. At trial, the sheriff who testified as to the 
warning was unable to state all of it, as required by Miranda. 
Nevertheless, the court held the minor's waiver effective. 
A minor's waiver was found to be effective in People v. 
Camarillo. 1 Camarillo, 17 years old, was convicted of murder 
on his signed statement. Apparently, his attorney at trial 
objected to introduction of the statement solely on the basis 
that the defendant was under 18. Thus, when the court ap-
plied the Lara totality-of-the-circumstances rule, there was 
no evidence either of unfairness on the part of the police or 
of particular disabilities of the youth-mentality, education, 
or the like. In fact, the only evidence deemed pertinent by the 
court was harmful: "roving about at late hours, committing 
crimes of violence and associating with codefendants."2 Thus, 
the court inferred from Lara a presumption of effective waiver 
that could be overcome only by evidence of a youth's in-
capacity. It is doubtful that the Lara court intended this re-
sult or that Gault permits it. 
There are four California Courts of Appeal decisions hold-
ing evidence in juvenile proceedings to be inadmissible be-
cause there had been no effective waiver of Miranda rights. 
The first of these, chronologically, is In Re Butterfield.3 The 
petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding was a 15-year-old 
girl uncontradictedly described as a "schizophrenic reaction, 
schizoaffective type." At the juvenile court's adjudicatory 
hearing, the petition against the juvenile was read to her and 
20. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556, 2. 266 Cal. App.2d 523,531-532.72 
16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94-95, 86 S.Ct. 1045, Cal. Rptr. 296, 301. 
1054 (1966). 3. 253 Cal. App.2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
1. 266 Cal. App.2d 523, 72 Cal. Rptr. 874 (967), 
296 (1968). 
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she answered affirmatively to the probation officer's inquiry 
whether the charges were true. On this basis alone, the peti-
tion was sustained. 
The reviewing court held this self-incriminating statement 
to be inadmissible. The court did so even though the record 
reflected that the girl was accompanied by her mother at the 
hearing and that both of them were advised of the minor's 
right to counsel. Nonetheless, the court found, relying on 
Gault, that "[t]he formal and literal waiver of counsel was 
ineffectual because [it was] not made with an intelligent under-
standing of its consequences."4 This was so because there 
was no evidence that the minor had any awareness of her 
right to refrain from self-incrimination. Indeed, the court 
found the emotionally disturbed minor to have no comprehen-
sion that long-term confinement in a correctional institution 
was a possible consequence.6 
The minor in In Re T eters6 was found to be a ward of the 
court on the basis of his confession that he had stolen an auto-
mobile. The confession constituted the only evidence on 
which the adjudication was made. The appellant had been 
taken into custody initially on the belief that he was a run-
away. The police had reason to believe that he might be re-
sponsible for an auto theft that had recently occurred. Once 
in custody, the minor was asked about the automobile, and 
eventually admitted that he had taken the car. At that point, 
the officer advised the minor of his Miranda rights, by read-
4. 253 Cal. App.2d 794, 797-798, 
61 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877. 
5. In a very perceptive dictum, the 
court decried the probation depart-
ment's filing of a § 602 petition alleging 
that the minor was a delinquent. Orig-
inally, a § 601 petition was filed because 
the child had run away from her par-
ent's home. Before the petition could 
be heard, the minor was committed to a 
mental institution for three 90-day pe-
riods. At the completion of this com-
mitment, the petition was heard and 
the girl found to be a § 601 ward of 
544 
the court. A month later, the girl in-
gested an overdose of pills. It was on 
the basis of this suicide attempt alone 
that the § 602 petition was filed. Such 
an escalation is permitted whenever a 
ward of the court disobeys a lawful or-
der of the court. The reviewing court 
characterized her suicide attempt as a 
product of psychic imbalance in no way 
associated with the opprobrium reflect-
ed by a § 602 delinquency petition. 
6. 264 Cal. App.2d 816, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 749 (1968). 
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ing them from a card. The minor then made a complete con-
fession, which was repeated at the adjudicatory hearing. 
The reviewing court held that Miranda attached as soon as 
the minor was in custody, because at that time he was suspect-
ed of auto theft. The court admitted that the police officers 
were neither oppressive nor coercive. Nevertheless, the court 
determined that the admission was made "under the condi-
tions which invite coerced confessions and other evils of cus-
todial interrogation and falls within the scope of the Miranda 
warning rule."7 
In determining whether the subsequent confession made in 
court was necessarily tainted, the reviewing court followed 
Gault in reaching a determination. The reviewing court 
stated that Gault applied the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination to juveniles as well as to adults. Therefore, 
based on California decisions in adult criminal trials, the 
court determined that the confession at trial was impelled by 
the minor's extrajudicial confession and that the pre-trial con-
fession was inadmissible. 
Again, in In Re Rambeau,S the minor's wardship under sec-
tion 601 was predicated solely upon a confession. Here, the 
court found the Miranda warning had been given. However, 
the court went on, "[C]ompliance with the requirement of 
warning contained in [Miranda] is not enough to settle the 
matter, at least in a case involving a minor."9 After quoting 
extensively from Gault, the court stated the reasons that the 
confession, made during an illegal detention, could not be 
separated from such unlawful detention. First, no attempt 
was made to contact the 17-year-old minor's father. Second, 
the court noted that Welfare and Institutions Code section 
625 authorizes a police officer to take a minor into temporary 
custody without a warrant but, unless the minor is promptly 
released, he must be taken without delay before a probation 
officer. The police did not do this, but instead detained him 
7. 264 Cal. App.2d816, 820-821, 70 9. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 4-5, 72 Cal. 
Cal. Rptr. 749, 752. Rptr. 171, 174. 
8. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
171 (1968). 
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and proceeded to interrogate him. Third, the court found 
the generality of the questioning by the police to be an invita-
tion to a confession of guilt. 
In Re H.L.R./o involved a particularly unsavory instance 
of police interrogation of a 16-year-old grossly affected by 
drugs. Applying the Lara totality-of-the-circumstances test to 
the question of effective waiver of Miranda rights, the court 
found that, in the circumstances described, the prosecution 
had failed to establish its burden of proof that the minor's 
waiver had been effective.ll 
C. Admissibility of Evidence 
Two cases addressed themselves to the importance of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code's insistence on a bifurcated 
hearing and a related requirement that the probation officer's 
social study of the juvenile to be offered the court be withheld 
until jurisdiction of the court has been adjudicated. In the 
earlier days of the juvenile court, the probation officer's report 
concerning a youth, replete with extrajudicial statements of 
varying degrees of reliability, was furnished the judge be-
fore the jurisdictional hearing. Theoretically, he disregarded 
the information in the report in determining the issue of juris-
diction. This practice was heavily criticized in the report of 
the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice, 
1960. Consequently, the 1961 Juvenile Court Act eliminated 
this practice. Two clear stages of the juvenile court proceed-
ings-one jurisdictional, and the other dispositional-were 
established. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 701, 702, 
and 706, taken together, permit the judge to consider the pro-
bation officer's report only at the dispositional stage, after ju-
risdiction has been found. 
10. 269 Cal. App.2d 610, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 308 (1969). 
11. 269 Cal. App.2d 610, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 308. Two other cases provide 
perspective on the question of effective 
waiver. People v. Cooper, 268 Cal. 
App.2d 34, 73 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1968) 
approves the appointment of counsel 
546 
for a 15-year-old witness. Such solici-
tude profitably could be transported into 
the Miranda waiver cases. On the oth-
er hand, an ll-year-old boy was found 
to be criminally negligent in the case of 
In Re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 81 
Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969). 
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In the case of In Re Corey/2 the reviewing court deter-
mined that there was substantial admissible evidence on which 
to sustain the court's imposition of jurisdiction under section 
602. Nonetheless, because the probation report had been 
considered by the juvenile court before the jurisdictional 
hearing was conducted, the reviewing court reversed the judg-
ment. "Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the 
jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court's 
error in receiving the social study before the jurisdictional 
hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the 
resulting adjudication is [invalid]. .'>13 Both the lan-
guage and the approach of this opinion accurately reflect the 
philosophy of Gault. 
Reversal was required, too, in In Re F.l4 In this case, as 
in Corey, the court had examined the probation report before 
resolving the disputed allegations of the section 602 petition. 
The reviewing court found the adjudication invalidated by 
premature consideration of the probation report, which the 
court characterized as containing much hearsay, prejudicial 
matter unrelated to the charged offense, and recommendations 
unfavorable to the minor.16 
Two other cases involved questions of the admissibility of 
evidence in juvenile hearings. In Re M.G.S. 16 establishes the 
salutary rule that an admission of guilt cannot be made by 
a minor's attorney, but must be offered by the minor himself. 
The reviewing court found that it was obligatory on the 
juvenile court to reject the offered admission. Admission by 
counsel alone provides no basis on which to sustain a delin-
quency petition. 
In Re Rambeau,17 previously discussed in the waiver section 
12. 266 Cal. App.2d 295, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 115 (1968). 
13. 266 Cal. App.2d 295, 298-299, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118. 
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 603, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 887 (1969). 
15. 270 Cal. App.2d 603, 604-605, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 887, 888. These two 
cases, In re Corey and In re F, have 
CAL LAW 1970 
now been approved by a decision of 
the California Supreme Court issued 
since preparation of this article, In re 
R, 1 Ca1.3d 855, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 
464 P.2d 127 (1970). 
16. 267 Cal. App.2d 329, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 808 (1968). 
17. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
171 (1968). 
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above, also stands for the proposition that a statement taken 
in violation of Miranda rights is inadmissible in a section 601 
proceeding, as well as one under section 602. The distinction 
between the two proceedings is, of course, in the type of evi-
dence that can be received. Both proceedings require that the 
allegations of the petition be sustained only on a preponder-
ance of evidence. But in the section 602 hearing, evidence 
may be received only if it is admissible in the trial of criminal 
cases. In section 601 hearings, however, evidence admissible 
in the trial of civil cases is sufficien t. 18 Nevertheless, even 
conceding that a section 601 proceeding may be "civil," the 
Rambeau court construed the Gault requirement of funda-
mental fairness in juvenile proceedings to require the exclusion 
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda. 
D. Right to Jury Trial 
In Re T.R.S.19 raises the major issue of the minor's right to 
trial by jury.20 Unfortunately, the court disposes of the con-
tention with only cursory consideration. The court refers 
to Gault for the proposition that "the federal Constitution 
'does not require that the full panoply of rights accorded to 
an adult accused of crime be erected in the juvenile court.' "1 
Relying on In Re M, the court rejected trial by jury because 
it would "introduce a strong tone of criminality into the pro-
ceedings. "2 
18. Welf. and lnst. Code § 701. 
19. 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
574 (1969). 
20. This question was raised but not 
decided in De Backer v. Brainard, 396 
U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 148, 90 S.Ct. 163 
(Nov. 12, 1969), and in the Gault de-
cision itself. 
1. 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 181-183, 81 
Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969) (citing In Re 
M., 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4). 
2. 70 Cal.2d 444, 456, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
1, 8, 450 P.2d 296, 302-303, but com-
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pare In Re M, 70 Cal.2d 444, 465-466, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14, 450 P.2d 296, 308-
309 (dissenting opinion): "Certainly 
the right to a jury trial and the right to 
insist that guilt be shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt are fundamental and 
constitutional rights in a criminal case." 
See also Boches, Juvenile Justice in 
California: ARe-evaluation, 19 Hast-
ings L.J., 47, 88-90, where a strong 
argument is advanced that Gault may 
compel the right to trial by jury for 
juveniles. 
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E. Referral to Adult Court 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 waiver proceed-
ings are strongly affected by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Kent, a waiver case, as well as by the gen-
eral philosophy of Gault. In the decision of M v. Superior 
Court,3 waiver was predicated solely on the basis of the offense 
that the minor allegedly had committed. The reviewing court 
found this result to be prohibited by the 1967 amendment to 
section 707, which expressly states that "the offense, in itself, 
shall not be sufficient to support [waiver]." Additionally, 
there was a failure of the probation department to submit, and 
the court to consider, a report on the behavioral patterns of 
the minor that is also required by section 707. Accordingly, 
transfer of the minor to an adult court was invalidated. 
M v. Superior Court relied heavily on the decision in 
Richerson v. Superior Court.4 Here again, transfer was de-
termined without reference to the minor's behavioral back-
ground. Indeed, an extensive description of the minor presents 
the picture of a youth completely amenable to the rehabilita-
tive purposes of the juvenile court. Ultimately, the reviewing 
court was compelled to conclude that the trial judge must have 
"overlooked" the 1967 amendment to section 707. 
F. Section 600 Dependency and Neglect Cases 
The 1967 report of the National Crime Commission recom-
mended that juvenile court jurisdiction over dependent 
youths be abolished, since such cases involve inability, rather 
than willful failure, to provide properly for children, and can 
more appropriately be dealt with by social, nonjudicial agen-
cies. Indeed, section 600 proceedings, involving, as they do, 
no "act" of the child at all, are at best an anomaly in any court. 
Recent dependency cases illustrate the inadequacy of the 
juvenile court to deal with such situations. 
The most significant recent dependency case is In Re Raya. 5 
3. 270 Cal. App.2d 566, 75 Cal. Rptr. 5. 255 Cal. App.2d 260, 63 Cal 
881 (1969). Rptr 252 (1967). 
4. 264 Cal. App.2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
350 (1968). 
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There, section 600 petitions were sustained against a whole 
family of children, both their parents were deprived of cus-
tody, and the children were committed to an institution. The 
conclusion that the children lacked proper and effective care 
and control rested solely on the circumstance that the chil-
dren's natural parents each had lived in unmarried cohabita-
tion with other partners for more than five years. What the 
juvenile court failed to consider, however, was: ( 1) that the 
mother's extramarital relationship was a stable one in which 
the children were happy, healthy, well-adjusted, and provided 
with love, security, and physical well-being,6 and (2) that 
poverty alone had prevented the parents' divorce and legitima-
tion of their present relationships. The Raya court noted the 
danger of imposing on the poor standards adopted from the 
well-to-do, standards that "may avoid a theoretical discrimina-
tion and create a practical one.,,7 The court stressed that in 
wardship proceedings, the welfare of the child must be the 
paramount concern. The dominant parental right to custody 
requires an extreme situation before judicial intervention may 
be justified. Finding no such evidence in this case, the court 
terminated the children's wardship. 
Raya was followed in almost identical circumstances in In 
Re A.l.8 Here, a section 600 petition was sustained by reason 
of the mother's "depravity." Such depravity was based solely 
on the mother's cohabitation with a man not her husband. 
Here, too, poverty alone prevented the mother from marrying 
the man with whom she was living. The reviewing court 
adopted the rationale of Raya and refused to apply "dominant 
socio-economic standards which might compel the institution-
alization of the child." 
In Re L 9 applied familiar due-process requirements to de-
pendency proceedings. In this case, a child whose mother was 
found unfit was removed from the mother's custody by the 
juvenile court. Previously, the child's parents had divorced, 
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 260, 266-267, 8. 274 Cal. App.2d 225, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256. 880 (1969). 
7. 255 Cal. App.2d 260, 267-268, 63 9. 267 Cal. App.2d 397, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
Cal. Rptr. 252, 257. 76 (1968). 
550 CAL LAW 1970 
26
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19
Juvenile Law 
and the divorce decree had deprived the father of the child's 
custody. Once the juvenile court had assumed jurisdiction 
of the child, however, such jurisdiction was exclusive with 
regard to the minor's custody. The L Court, like the Raya 
Court, took note of the strong policy of the civil code to pre-
serve both the right and responsibility of a parent with regard 
to custody of the child. The same policy is manifested in the 
juvenile code. Thus, Welfare and Institutions Code section 
726 precludes deprivation of the parents' right to custody of 
their child, even though the child be a ward of the court, ex-
cept in very limited circumstances. Protection of the parents' 
rights demands that custody be denied only as the result of 
proceedings that satisfy due process requirements. Accord-
ingly, In Re L holds that such custody could not be withheld 
without an express finding by the court that the child's father 
was incapable of providing proper custody and control. 
A final dependency case, In Re Schmidt/a states that the 
jurisdiction of a juvenile court is not geographically limited. 
The location of the proceedings is deemed a matter of venue 
rather than of jurisdiction. Attack on such an issue was held· 
to be appropriate, then, only by appeal and not by collateral 
proceedings. 
G. Miscellaneous 
An unreported case, Gonzalez v. M ailliard, 11 attacked the 
constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 
because of vagueness. As of this printing, no decision has 
been rendered. 
In In Re M.G.S.,12 the court, relying upon Gault, appears to 
conclude, in dictum, that the failure of counsel to present the 
defense of a minor's insanity deprives the minor of his con-
stitutional right to effective aid of counsel. 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 proceedings. 
as described above, permit continued incarceration of a minor 
10. 268 Cal. App.2d 137, 73 Cal. 12. 267 Cal. App.2d 329, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 791 (1968). Rptr. 808 (1968). 
11. Civil Action No. 50424, N.D. 
Calif., (December 9, 1968). 
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who reaches 21 years of age but whose release would constitute 
a physical danger to the pUblic. The court in In Re ].F.13 
notes that such a commitment is based primarily on a predic-
tion of what the minor is likely to do in the future. The very 
grave constitutional problems inherent in such a provision for 
preventive detention, however, are merely raised and neither 
discussed nor decided in this opinion. 
H. School Cases 
The constitutional consideration for minors illustrated by 
Gault and Kent has now been extended with equal vigor to 
the minor's relationship with his school in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.14 In an 
already famous dictum, the United States Supreme Court stat-
ed, "[I]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate."15 The students in Tinker were 
suspended from school for wearing black armbands to pub-
licize their objections to the Vietnam war. The Court found 
their activity to be "closely akin to 'pure speech,' " and thus 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment. The Court 
placed a heavy burden on school authorities to justify infringe-
ment of students' First Amendment rights. This burden re-
quires the school officials to sustain a clear showing that a 
student's "engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operations of the school.' »16 By con-
trast, "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance 
is not enough."17 
The Court thus recognized students to be citizens. "Stu-
dents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our 
13. 268 Cal. App.2d 761, 74 Cal. 16. 393 U.S. 503, 509, 21 L.Ed.2d 
Rptr. 464 (1969). 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 733, 738. 
14. 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 17. 393 U.S. 503, 508, 21 L.Ed.2d 
89 S.Ct. 733 (1969). 731, 738-739, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737. 
15. 393 U.S. 503, 506, 21 L.Ed.2d 
731, 737, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736. 
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constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights. 
"18 
The underlying rationale in Tinker is the Court's apprecia-
tion that education does not occur only within the classroom. 
"In our system, students may not be regarded as closed 
circuit recipients. . . ."19 Education does not take place 
only when it is ". . confined to the supervised and or-
dained discussion which takes place in the classroom. 
Among those activities [which occur within a school] is per-
sonal intercommunication among the students. This is not 
only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it 
is also an important part of the educational process."20 Tinker 
thus provides a significantly new view of the student as a re-
sponsible individual actively participating in his own educa-
tion. 
Students are recognized to be "constitutional" persons in the 
case of Meyers v. Arcata Union High School District.1 Meyers 
was ejected from school for violation of a school policy that 
stated that "extremes of hair style are not acceptable." 
The court first found that hair styles are entitled to the 
protection of the First Amendment. School authorities may 
nevertheless regulate the exercise of this constitutional right, 
as well as others, so long as they do so in a constitutionally 
satisfactory manner. Ironically, the school authorities could 
have drawn upon their residual statutory authority, comment-
ed the court, to regulate hair style on a showing of its disrup-
tive effect. Precisely this result was reached in the case of 
Akin v. Riverside School District Board of Education.2 But 
the Arcata authorities relied instead on their written policy, 
which the court found to be unconstitutionally vague. First 
Amendment rights, stated the court, may be regulated "only 
18. 393 U.S. 503, 511, 21 L.Ed.2d 
731,740, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739. 
19. 393 U.S. 503, 511, 21 L.Ed.2d 
731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739. 
20. 393 U.S. 503, 512, 21 L.Ed.2d 
731, 741, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739-740. 
CAL LAW 1970 
1. 269 Cal. App.2d 549, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 68 (1969); for further discussion 
of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, in this volume. 
2. 262 Cal. App.2d 161, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 557 (1968). 
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with narrow specificity," and the phrase "extremes of hair 
styles" did not satisfy this exacting standard.3 
Alvarez v. Santa Clara Unified School District,4 follows 
Tinker in according California school students the right 
to wear politically significant berets and buttons in Cali-
fornia schools.4.5 On the other hand, In Re Donaldson,5 a 
locker search case, disregards Tinker's introduction of the 
Constitution to the school campus. The opinion resorts to dis-
credited rhetoric, reminiscent of apologies for the juvenile 
court, to describe a school principal as acting in loco parentis. 
The court improperly finds the principal not to be a state 
official within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Such a finding is unsupportable in light of Tinker. Having 
committed both these mistakes, the court is able to conclude 
incorrectly that marijuana obtained in an unlawful search and 
seizure by the school principal was properly admitted to sus-
tain a subsequent juvenile court delinquency petition. 
V. Conclusion 
California juvenile law in no way resembles a "kangaroo 
court";6 the legislature has seen to that. The rudimentary 
prerequisites enumerated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Kent and Gault are available to minors in California. But 
much remains to be done, both because the United States 
3. The face of the land is presently 
obscured by hirsute judicial decisions. 
See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 
(7th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Inde-
pendent School District, 392 F.2d 697 
(5th Cir. 1968); Richards v. Thurston, 
304 F. Supp. 499, 38 U.S. Law Week, 
2187 D. Mass. (Sept. 30, 1969) (a 
stylish decision by Massachusetts Dis-
trict Judge Wyzanski). 
4. N.D. Cal. Civil No. 50926 (1969). 
4.5. Two cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of § 9012 and § 9013 of 
the California Education Code, which 
provide a blanket prohibition against the 
distribution of "propaganda" on school 
premises, are currently pending before 
554 
a three-jUdge federal court, O'Reilly v. 
San Francisco Unified School District, 
N.D. Cal. Civil No. 51427 (leaflets), 
Rowe v. Campbell Union High School 
District, N.D. Cal. Civil No. 51060 (un-
derground newspaper). A temporary 
restraining order was issued in the Rowe 
case enjoining the school authorities 
from interfering with distribution of 
the underground newspaper pending the 
hearing before the three-judge court. 
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 509, 75 CaL 
Rptr. 220 (1969). 
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28, 18 L. 
Ed.2d 527, 546-547, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 
1444 (1967). 
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Supreme Court itself has only begun to domesticate juvenile 
law and because the California Supreme Court has been zeal-
ous to confine these beginnings. The holdings of Kent, Gault, 
and Tinker go no farther than they do because no more was 
required to dispose of the issues before the Court. A fair read-
ing of these decisions, though, demonstrates the Court's dis-
satisfaction with the rule of rhetoric. The cases consolidate 
contemporary youth's expectation of equal justice without 
regard to age. Indeed, Gault, in particular, evidences the 
Court's solicitude for minors; their separate and unequal treat-
ment can be justified only when the juvenile law affords 
them some demonstrable benefit. 
In Re M and Lara fail to fulfill the expectation. They show 
little more than lip service to the reality of the minors' situa-
tions, of the state's patterns and problems of delinquency, or 
of the thrust of the juvenile process. Much of the now-dis-
credited folklore and sentimenf still pervades those decisions 
and precludes any recognition of the implications of Gault and 
Kent. 
Lara and In Re M, taken together, make plain the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's determination to defer to the legislature's 
1961 and 1967 revisions of the juvenile code and, at the 
same time, to ignore the policy considerations that impelled 
tho~e revisions, in the same way that the court has disregarded 
the philosophy inherent in Gault and Kent. Silence, from 
either source, presumably provides a rationale for immobility. 
The revolution that Judge Bazelon predicted8 has hardly 
begun. Gault and Kent presage the erosion of the old rhetoric. 
But the California courts must acknowledge those cases as 
seminal, not exceptional. "The highest motives and most en-
lightened impulses" no longer justify uncritical perpetuation of 
the "peculiar system for juveniles.,,9 The California courts 
must still embark on that "candid appraisal"lo of the system 
that the United States Supreme Court and the times demand. 
7. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 9. 387 U.S. 1, 17, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. 
541-542, 87 s.Ct. 1428, 1440. 540, 87 s.Ct. 1428, 1438 (1967). 
8. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 10. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
408. 541-542, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1440. 
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APPENDIX 
Constitutional U. S. Supreme California 
Rights Court Cases Statutes California Cases 
I. Adequate In Re Gault, W & I Code §§ 630, 
Notice 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 630.1,658, 660 
II. Right to In Re Gault W & I Code §§ 625, In Re M. G. S., 
Counsel 627.5, 633, 634, 72 Cal. Rptr. 808 
679,700 (1968) 
People v. Cooper, 
268 Cal. App.2d 34, 
73 Cal. Rptr. 608 
(1968) 
III. Self-Incrim- In Re Gault W & I Code §§ 625 Scott v. Mayer, 
ination (Miranda warning (N.D. Cal. Civil No. 
required) 627.5, 702.5 C-FO 441GSL, 1970) 
IV. Confrontation In Re Gault W & I Code §§ 630, 
and Cross- 702.5 
Examination 
V. Right of Ap- In Re Gault (not 
peal decided) 
(Adequate 
Review) Kent v. U. S., 
383 U.S. 541 (1966) 
VI. Right to 
Transcript of 
Proceedings W & I Code § 800 
VII. Rules of 
Evidence 
A. Admissi-
bility of 
Hearsay In Re Corey, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 115 
(1968) 
In Re F, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 887 
(1969) 
In Re R, 
83 Cal. Rptr. 671 
(1970) 
B. Standard In Re Whittington, W & I Code § 701 In Re M, 
of Proof 391 U.S. 341 (1968) 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (\969) 
De Backer v. In Re K. D. K., 
Brainard, 75 Cal. Rptr. 136 
396 U.S. 28, (1969) 
90 S.Ct. 179 (1969) 
In Re Winship, 
396 U.S. -, 25 L Ed 
2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 179 
(1969) 
C. General In Re M. G. S., 
72 Cal. Rptr. 808 
(1968) 
In Re Rambeau, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 171 
(1968) 
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Appendix 
Constitutional 
Rights 
VIII. Pre-judicial 
Stage Rights 
IX. Postadjudi-
cative Rights 
X. Right to 
Bail 
XI. Right to 
Arraignment 
XII. Right to 
Indictment by 
Grand Jury 
XIII. Right to 
Public Trial 
XIV. .search and 
Seizure 
XV. 
(4th Amend-
ment) 
Right to Trial 
by Jury 
XVI. Arrest With-
out Warrant 
in Misde-
meanor Cases 
XVII. Waiver of 
Miranda 
Rights 
CAL LAW 1970 
U. S. Supreme 
Court Cases 
De Backer v. 
Brainard, 
396 U.S. 28, 
90 S.Ct. 163 (1969) 
In Re Gault 
(not decided) 
California 
Statutes California Cases 
In Re Donaldson, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 220 
(1968) 
In Re T. R. S., 
81 Cal. Rptr. 574 
(1969) 
(Waiver ok) 
People v. Lara, 
62 Cal. Rptr. 586 
(1967) 
In Re M, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 1 
(1969) 
People v. Camarillo 
72 Cal. Rptr. 296 
(1968) 
(No waiver-"totality 
of circumstances") 
In Re Butterfield, 
61 Cal. Rptr. 874 
(1967) 
In Re Teters, 
7() Cal. Rpt-. 749 
(1968) 
In Re H. L. R., 
75 Cal. Rptr. 308 
(1969) 
In Re Rambeau, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 171 
(1%8) 
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Constitutional 
Rights 
XVIII. First Amend-
ment School 
Rights 
XIX. Fifth Amend-
ment 
( Vagueness) 
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U. S. Supreme 
Court Cases 
Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Commu-
nity School District, 
393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
California 
Statutes 
Appendix 
California Cases 
Meyers v. Arcata 
Union High School 
Dist., 
75 Cal. Rptr. 68 
(1969) 
Akin v. Riverside 
School District Board 
of Education, 
68 Cal. Rptr. 557 
(1968) 
Alvarez v. Santa Clara 
Unified School Dist. 
(N. D. Cal. Civil No. 
50926, 1969) 
Rowe v. Campbell 
Union High Schcol 
District, N. D. Cal. 
Civil No. 51060 
O'Reilly v. San 
Francisco Unified 
School District, 
N. D. Cal. Civil 
No. 51427 
Gonzalez v. Mailliard, 
Civil Action No. 
50424, (N. D., Cal., 
Dec. 9, 1969) 
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